Understanding Variation on Asylum Application Success Rates Across the European Union

Despite not constituting a new phenomenon, with migration dating back to the very earliest periods of human history, over the last number of years it has emerged as a particularly important policy challenge. We are currently witnessing the worst humanitarian and refugee crisis of our time with the number of forcibly displaced people worldwide reaching 68.5 million people (UNCHR, 2018). The crisis, which has hit European shores, peaked in 2015 when EU member states observed almost 1.3 million applications for international protection (European Parliament, 2017). Political tensions across the continent ensued, as disagreements arose on how to effectively deal with the humanitarian situation, responsibility share and maintain EU values. Despite the existence of the framework of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS), vast disparities exist across the European Union in relation to asylum application success rates. Following a background to current dynamics, the lens of analysis and an examination of the economic arguments for more generous immigration policies, this paper will examine possible variables in accounting for policy difference. This will be constructed under the subsections of; Economic Conditions and Perceptions, Partisan Politics Theory and Institutionally Speaking.

Current Dynamics

In discussing involuntary migration, we are referring to those forced to migrate “owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion” (UN General Assembly, 1951). Globalisation has created a “death of distance” in the world (Cairncross, 1997). A journey of a world moving towards ‘post-nationalism’ was argued by many theorists in the 1990s, in which universal rights would be realised and prevail (Stasiulis, 1997). Naturally, the EU was viewed as a case study with the observation of rights recognitions not solely tied to national citizenship. Instead, “new forms of post-national membership and rights” triumphed which were “protected by international human rights provisions…and increasingly accepted and indeed organised by nation states” (Stasiulis 1997). However, in a current climate of nationalism resurgence with parties disparaging migrants gaining ground, previous conceptions have proved ill-founded. The normative defence of sovereignty is often put forward by nation states who no longer see the importance of migrants to nation-building.

For the study of this paper, the “theoretically correct recognition rate is the percentage of asylum claims recognized relative to the number of asylum claims lodged” (Neumayer, 2005). However, although data is usually provided annually, it is appropriate to assume that applications for asylum are not exclusively decided upon in the same year that they are filed. It is, therefore, more accurate to examine recognition values as the number of positive outcomes relative to the number of applications decided upon in a given year. Positive outcomes comprise decisions that grant “refugee status, subsidiary protection status, authorization to stay for humanitarian reasons (for countries where applicable) and temporary protection”. In attempting to undertake the most up-to-date analysis, this paper will examine first instance decisions for 2018 in which there was an overall 37% positive outcome for 582 thousand applications (Eurostat, 2019).

In examining the data, the highest shares of positive first instance asylum decisions in 2018 were recorded in Ireland (86%) and Luxemburg (76%). The highest rejection rates occurred in France, Estonia, Spain, Latvia, Poland and the Czech Republic. These rates fell between 71% in France and 89% in the Czech Republic. Poland and the Czech Republic’s low recognition rates regarding applications for asylum is not surprising. An infringement procedure against the two member states was launched in June 2017 by the European Commission for failing to fulfil their obligations under the European Council’s Relocation Decisions surrounding asylum seekers (ECRE, 2018). With major backlogging in Ireland’s application process and asylum seekers last year expecting “to wait two years before they will receive a decision on their asylum claim”, Ireland rests on top of the positive first instance decisions with this data in consideration of decisions decided upon in a given year, rather than total applications lodged. However, this is also surprising as the total positive decisions since 2016 have more than doubled from 485 to 1,005. This is in comparison to Germany whose total positive decisions have fallen from 433,905 in 2016 to 75,940 in 2018. In total, 6 EU member states have increased their total number of positive applications since 2016 (Ireland, France, Croatia, Luxemburg, Poland, UK). Of course, a differing in the total number of applications filed yearly must be considered.

In further examining the data, we can calculate mean positive recognition regarding applications for asylum in Europe in 2018 at 7,781 per country. However, with a median of 1,003 and a range of between 20 and 75,940, it is absolutely positive that we can say European destination countries do indeed follow very different approaches in reaction to the current refugee crisis. This is an interesting area as considering the history of many member states and their own experiences with war and displacement, asylum policies are clearly outlined within the core values of the EU with respects to human dignity and solidarity. The first important instrument for refugee protection came in 1951 with the Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, which each EU institution and member state at various occasions have declared their commitments to. In a meeting of the European Council in Tampere in 1999, the aim to establish an “open and secure European Union, fully committed to the obligations of the Geneva Refugee Convention and other human rights instruments, and able to respond to humanitarian needs on the basis of solidarity” was established (European Council, 1999). The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, created in 2000 and legally binding since the Lisbon Treaty of 2009, protects the ‘right to asylum’ (article 18). It states that the right “to asylum shall be guaranteed with due respect for the rules of the Geneva Convention… and in accordance with the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union” (European Union, 2000). This has led to the argument that the Charter not only allows for the protection for the right to seek asylum but also the right to be granted asylum (Gil-Bazo, 2008). Finally, relevant to this set of procedures equating an EU Common European Asylum System (CEAS), the Asylum Procedures Directive (2013) aims to create better quality asylum decisions.

Viewing Migration Economically

As Clift (2014) stated, “analysis needs to recognise the political, the economic and the social are always intertwined”. The economic ‘style of reasoning’ includes basic concepts such as incentives, growth, efficiency and externalities (Hacking, 1992). It includes economic ways of approaching problems: by using models, systematically weighing costs and benefits, analysing quantitative empirical data, considering incentives, and thinking marginally. Considering migration in such terms, benefits include boosting the working-age population, aiding human capital development and reducing niches in growing and declining sectors of the economy (OECD, 2014). A relocation of labour from low to high productivity places would also seem to be redistributive and globally efficient. Keenan (2013) finds that under such theory “the estimated net gains from open borders are about the same as the gains from a growth miracle that more than doubles the income level in less-developed countries.” Studies show global gross domestic product (GWP) increasing in the range of 50-150%, with a summary of these predictions provided in Clemens (2011). Examining common environments with constant physical capital and considering a lack of difference in the productivity of people, migration liberalisation increases GWP by 147.3% in Hamilton and Whalley (1984), 96.5% in Moses and Letnes (2004) and 122% in Klein and Ventura (2007). Iregui (2005) considers differences in workers’ educational attainments and finds an overall GWP increase of 67%. Further studies by Walmsley and Winters (2005) simulated the effects of increasing developed countries immigration quotas, such that high and low-skilled migrants accounted for 3% of the workforce. In such instances, a $150 billion increase was predicted for the GWP.

Given that immigration is heavily restricted in developed countries, gains accruing to immigrants are perceived as an offset to disadvantages to natives. Kancs and Leca (2016) examine the long-term effects of immigration on the EU economically and fiscally. Their study shows that while refugee integration is indeed costly for public budgets, in the long-run benefits may significantly outweigh initial costs. They find that “depending on the integration policy scenario and policy financing method, the annual long-run GDP effect would be 0.2% to 1.4% above the baseline growth, and the full repayment of the integration policy investment (positive the net present value) would be achieved after 9 to 19 years”. A report from the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (2017) finds that over a period of ten years or more, the impact of immigration on the wages of native-born workers is relatively small. Any negative impacts are most likely to be found for those with low education although positive wage effects are also seen for some. Furthermore, in sending countries, Elsner (2015) finds that the bargaining power of emigration and labour shortages leads to wage boosts for non-emigrants. In looking at Ireland as a case study, research finds a lower probability of migrants being in receipt of cash benefits relative to natives and do not appear to be a ‘burden’ on the welfare state (Barrett and McCarthy, 2007 and 2008). More recent research backs this up in finding the probability of immigrants in the UK receiving benefits is less likely than that of natives and immigrants have “made substantial net contributions to its public finances, a reality that contrasts starkly with the view often maintained in public debate” (Dustmann and Frattinni, 2014). However, the more overtly politicized an issue is, such as immigration, the less likely economists will independently influence policy outcomes. In such cases incentives to challenge expert recommendations remain high (Bernstein, 2001).

Explaining Variations

Economic Conditions and Perspectives

As Gourevitch (1986) explains, “economic policy can tell us a lot about policy alternatives, but unless our economics contains an understanding of power, it will not tell us enough to understand the choices actually made”. Powerfully held understandings surrounding economic policy must also be examined in conjunction with the above. It is true that in economically prosperous countries, policies catering for immigrants are more likely. One reason is due to the existence of larger funds which Roel and Jenissen (2004) also state allows for countries to “offer asylum seekers better facilities during their asylum procedures”. In prosperous times, unemployment is likely to be a concern, which can otherwise negatively influence public opinion for attending to immigration issues. The increasing competition engendered by processes of economic globalization has resulted in new social divisions by marginalising the working class and isolating the elite. This economic marginalization makes voters opt for the extreme right to voice their discontent, for example in reducing immigration as they are often blamed for difficulties in the labour market. Among the classes most likely to support the extreme right, small business owners have been considered a potential, with lower levels of education and potential victims to economic modernization and structural change in terms of increasing competition. This was demonstrated with the euro crisis which gave an opportunity for the radical right in northern Europe. Timo Soini, leader of the radical right Finns Party, was adamantly opposed to the euro zone’s crisis strategy, declaring that the Greek bailouts were a “pyramid scheme.” According to Lesziewicz (2015), “the economic crisis hit old industrial areas particularly badly, which prompted the working class to leave the Social Democrats and move to support the Finns party in protest.” Furthermore, in relation to the growth of income inequality in Finland, general secretary of UNI Global Union stated that it “has contributed to the sense that the economy is not working for people. This feeds a feeling of insecurity which is then exploited by hard-right populists.” Naumann and Stoetzer (2018) also examined attitudes towards immigration in relation to labour. According to their ‘increased labour market competition model’, the status of an immigrants skill level remained important due to concerns over fluctuations of a native’s personal wage and fiscal pressures. To examine such a link, the concept of inclusive wealth per capita is important. Introduced by the United Nations in 2012, wealth per capita “is the social value (not dollar price) of all its capital assets, including natural capital, human capital and produced capital” (United Nations, 2018). It includes measurements such as a population’s education and skills, as well as machinery, buildings, infrastructure and natural resources. Using GDP to judge economic performance has been described as “judging a company by its quarterly profits, without ever peeking at its balance-sheet” (The Economist, 2012). As such, wealth per capita can be used as an explanatory variable with the proposal that recognition levels in relation to asylum will be higher among those that score better.

Partisan Politics Theory

Political parties are perceived as representatives of social constituencies that have different ideological stances for social democratic or conservative welfare policies. With social constituencies mostly defined in terms of industrial class, policy output has a linear and direct relationship to the partisan composition of government. In general, studies under this theory postulate that left parties represent and mobilise lower wage earners and the “working class, as the flagship of redistributive collectivism” (Korpi, 1989). They stand for the beneficiaries of the welfare state and are opposed to cuts with social policy. In examining this theory with immigration, Alfonso’s (2018) paper examining Western Europe after World War II is interesting. The decades following the war were marked by booming economies but significant labour shortages and different countries across the continent could be contrasted in their policy decisions. In Sweden, Alfonso (2018) finds that there was a Social Democratic government with strong ties to the labour unions. With generous employee benefits, rights and a strong inclusion of females in the workforce. Migration from Eastern Europe was then viewed as a challenge to the social care model, with a restrained approach undertaken by the Swedish government in office when it came to boarding the immigrant worker. In contrast, Switzerland’s conservative government and welfare regime benefited guest worker programmes, allowing the labour market to expand at low cost. However, politics as a simple choice between two opposing forms of governance is often seen as overly simplified fashion or “as a simple transmission belt conveying the preferences and demands of various interest groups to the leaders, who implement them” (Korpi, 1989). Social structure and electoral behaviour have evolved since the 1970s, entailing a range of electoral dealignments and realignments.

Highly-skilled middle class voters are increasingly attracted to left-wing parties, in particular women. There is a new electorate of young, highly educated, libertarian voters who are driven by cultural shifts, rather than economic factors. There are new demands for more market-liberal social investment agendas, rather than a core focus towards traditional redistributive schemes. Working class interests, as discussed under economic variables above, have also witnessed a shift. Adherence to traditionalist and anti-immigration views have seen many abandon the left for the more populist right. Typical policy agendas have undergone transformation, and the growing threat of electoral loss has possibly seen the left become more welfare chauvinistic. Nonetheless, in ranking order, we are to expect the more radical right to defend the welfare status quo, while those to the left to be more redistributive. Radical policy shifts occur when the supporters of a new paradigm secure positions of authority over policymaking and can rearrange the organization and standard operating procedures of the policy process. However, this often has elements of personal interest. In examining asylum application success, identifying a nation’s government’s political positioning is a potential explanatory variable.

Institutionally Speaking

In 2004, the EU witnessed a period of several Eastern and Central European countries joining the EU. However, labour markets once again were often not liberalised for migrants arriving from these new member states. In fact, 15 existing member states chose to keep markets extremely rigid following enlargement. Boeri and Brucker (2005) argue that European labour markets are characterised by unyielding institutions in relation to the forces of supply and demand, ultimately preventing the market from clearing. Negative externalities are born due to conflict between the native and the migrant population such as unemployment and illegal activities. Boeri and Brucker’s (2005) research also imply that there has been a ‘race to the top’ effect with restrictive migration regulations. However, the impact of interest groups on policy-making rests with differing levels of entry points across the union. An OECD (2018) report ‘Settling In’ evaluates the degree of a country’s existing immigrant community’s integration into the native society. They find that the degree of which a country’s immigrant community have integrated into a country’s society has great impact on ensuring social cohesion and facilitating acceptance by natives. The report states that “integration challenges do not increase with the share of immigrants in the population. There is no obvious link between the proportion of immigrants in the total population and immigrant integration outcomes. If anything, countries that are home to high proportions of immigrants tend to have better integration outcomes.” From this report, it is assumed that more generous asylum policies are supported by countries which have successfully integrated existing non-native populations, regardless of size. Thus, in comparing European asylum application rates, it would be expected that more positive levels would be found in countries with high integration. Identifying immigrant integration is a variable and could perhaps be measured by participation in labour markets and educational attainment.

Conclusion

Extreme variation among recognition rates regarding applications for asylum across the European Union is a worrying trend. Analysis of the data confirms that there is an urgent need for increased coordination of policy to take place. This is in spite of the fact the EU has employed procedures of harmonisation under the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) and each country acting as signatories to the same international conventions regarding asylum. To suggest that policymakers respond to the “national interest” leaves us wondering how this national interest comes to be defined. The economic situation, the breakdown of a government’s political leanings and previous levels of immigrant integration in a country are three proposed variables in accounting for such policy differentiation. However, further testing of these links which is beyond the scope of this paper is necessary. While theorising about policy, it is crucial to remember that the fate of millions of refugees lie behind the data. Migrants are not exceptional or marginal figures, but rather the essential ingredient to which all existing societies have been sustained and expanded over time.

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