A Refugee Crisis or a Crisis of European Policy Making? – A Human Right’s Approach to EU Externalisation Practices with Turkey and Libya

Although not a new phenomenon, against the background of current huge worldwide displacement, the discourse of migration and borders is at the forefront of European politics. We are currently witnessing the worst humanitarian and refugee crisis of our time with the number of forcibly displaced people worldwide reaching 68.5 million people (UNCHR, 2018). The crisis which has hit European shores peaked in 2015 when EU member states observed almost 1.3 million applications for international protection (European Parliament, 2017). Political tensions across the continent ensued, as disagreements arose on how to effectively deal with the humanitarian situation, responsibility share and maintain EU values. Announced on the 18th of March 2016 between the EU and Turkey, the EU-Turkey Statement outlines various deterrence strategies for jointly addressing the crisis, with the ambition of managing irregular refugee migration to Europe via the Balkan route. Similarly, EU and Italian cooperation with Libya formalised under the Malta Declaration on the 3rd of February 2017, aims to curb the flow of migration via the Central Mediterranean. Both deals have claims of decreasing the death toll of migrants attempting to reach Europe. However, they have also been criticised severely with claims of European governments shrinking their responsibilities of refugee protection. Centrally resting on the liberal political thought and philosophy that a major element of the role and responsibility of states is to protect human rights; this essay will analyse both migration deals and the human impact of their outcomes.

Migration and Human Rights Theory:

Hannah Arendt (1951) described European migrants and refugees as “the most symptomatic group in contemporary politics” through exposing the paradox between the modern nation-state and the idea of natural rights. In today’s international order, the ability to migrate to a state other than one’s own and benefit from rights akin to that of a natural citizen is a “global marker of privilege” (Larking, 2018). For Bauman (1998), the freedom that comes with international mobility is the “most powerful and most coveted stratifying factor”. The degree to which a citizen’s rights are recognised both home and abroad and the level of mobility a country’s passport provides exists in hierarchies (Castle, 2005). Under this lens of analysis citizens of highly developed nations occupy the higher tiers, while those of less developed nations remain at that bottom. Although it is true that even within nations who rest at the top of this ladder inequality exists, universal enjoyment of human rights is disproportionately distributed and often correlates to privileged groups of citizenship. In the 1990s, many international relations theorists viewed the world as moving towards an era of ‘post-nationalism’, in which the universal realisation of rights would prevail (Stasiulis, 1997). Naturally at this time the EU was given as an example, in which rights recognition was not solely tied to national citizenship. Instead, “new forms of post-national membership and rights” triumphed which were “protected by international human rights provisions…and increasingly accepted and indeed organised by nation states” (Stasiulis 1997). However, in current dynamics of nationalism resurgence in which political parties disparaging migrants are gaining ground, it is clear this is not the case. Nations which once perceived themselves as settler societies no longer see the importance of migrants to nation building with the normative defence of sovereignty put forward.

As states are the contracting parties to international human rights treaties, it is not surprising that these treaties uphold state sovereignty. This is desirable form the standpoint of supporting political self-determination. However, it is true that “the boundaries of all current states are based on histories of violence and dispossession, and most are host to a number of different national, cultural and ethnic groups – some of which view themselves as politically autonomous” (Larking, 2018). It is arguable that how sovereignty is currently exercised is at odds with human right desires that the “recognition of the inherent dignity and the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world” (UDHR, 1948). An example of this is how unevenly shared the responsibility for providing for migrants and refugees is, with most displaced people existing within their own countries and regions. Through undergoing the costs of accommodating forced migrants, these nations themselves experience a lack of rights through an inability to “freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development” and “freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources” (ICCPR, 1966 and ICESCR, 1966). The perception of undermining current social conditions in top tier countries is a major blockage to achieving fairer burden-sharing.

Refugee Protection in the European Framework:

Migration theories of the twentieth century ted to have a focus on the economic push and pull factors (Lee, 1966; Sjaastad, 1962; Piore, 1979). Subject to criticism, they overlook many societal factors, processes and changes. In discussing involuntary migration, we are referring to those forced to migrate “owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion” (UN General Assembly, 1951). Considering the history of many member states and their own experiences with war and displacement, asylum policies are clearly outlined within the core values of the EU with respects to human dignity and solidarity. The first important instrument for refugee protection came in 1951 with the Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, which each EU institution at various occasions has declared their commitments to. With the Convention’s 1967 protocol, a body of rights was created to protect asylum seekers and refugees around the world, including non-refoulment, non-discrimination and freedom of movement, as well as outlining the responsibilities of states that grant asylum. In a meeting of the European Council in Tampere in 1999, the aim to establish an “open and secure European Union, fully committed to the obligations of the Geneva Refugee Convention and other human rights instruments, and able to respond to humanitarian needs on the basis of solidarity” was established (European Council, 1999). So, although the EU is not a direct contracting party to the Refugee Convention, the TFEU provides that the EU must abide by its laws and all member state parties to the convention are further bound (2008/C 115/01).

The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, created in 2000 and legally binding since the Lisbon Treaty of 2009, protects the ‘right to asylum’ (article 18). It states that the right “to asylum shall be guaranteed with due respect for the rules of the Geneva Convention… and in accordance with the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union” (European Union, 2000). This has led to the argument that the Charter not only allows for the protection for the right to seek asylum but also the right to be granted asylum (Gil-Bazo, 2008). Furthermore, article 19 of the Charter protects the possibility of refoulment. The concept of non-refoulment refers to the right of an individual not be returned to their country of origin if persecution is possible. The Court of Justice of the EU also provides interpretative guidance on asylum law, with the possibility of enhancing protection standards. However, despite this uniquely strong setting for the CJEU in shaping international law, Bank (2015) finds that “the 1951 Convention and other relevant treaties so far have not played a principal role in the Court’s practice, at least not as a matter of principle. When dealing with questions of interpretation of the EU asylum acquis, EU asylum legislation has been treated rather as a self-contained regime.” EU Members, as members of the Council of Europe, are also bound by Council of Europe treaties, the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), and other ratified international agreements that may apply, such as the Convention on the Rights of the Child in the case of minors.

Finally, to this set of procedures equating an EU Common European Asylum System (CEAS), the Asylum Procedures Directive (2013) aims to create better quality asylum decisions, the Receptions Conditions Directive (2013) deals with reception standards and the Qualification Directive (2011) clarifies grounds for protection. The Dublin System, comprising of the Dublin Convention (1990), Dublin II Regulation (2003) and Dublin III Regulation (2013) is a key instrument. The Dublin System states that an application for international protection must be reviewed by a single Member State. It stipulates that EU member states can choose to return asylum seekers to their country of first entry to process their asylum claim, so long as that country has an effective asylum system. This has left an unworkable burden on the EU member states of first arrival, mostly those in Southern Europe. During the first half of 2018, the Bulgarian EU Presidency moved discussions forward on seven draft legal texts which, together, were meant to constitute a comprehensive overhaul of the Dublin system. However, member states made little progress on the key issue of when (and how many) refugees would be relocated from the country of first arrival to other member states.

The EU-Turkey Statement:

On the 29th of November 2015, the EU and Turkey agreed on a Joint Action Plan which would increase Turkey-EU relations. A Readmission Agreement and a roadmap for the liberalisation of visas for Turkish nationals wishing to travel to the European Union had occurred almost two years prior (European Commission, 2014). However, as hundreds of thousands of migrants arrived in Europe in 2015, one of the most common points of entry was through the Balkan route, usually beginning in Turkey, with individuals then travelling through Bulgaria or Greece towards Northern Europe. The need to quickly cooperate with Turkey in order to increase the securitisation of European borders and to curb irregular migration flows led to the EU agreeing to increase accession negotiations and fast-track the lifting of visa requirements for Turkish citizens entering the Schengen zone. Furthermore, the EU provided an initial 3 billion euro to the Turkish government in attempts to alleviate the burden on the nation of hosting such a vast number of refugees and asylum seekers. However, as little gains were made by the EU and illegal entries remained high, a more drastic agreement under the EU-Turkey Statement followed on the 18th of March 2016. Brokered most notably by the Dutch EU presidency and German Chancellor Angela Merkel who pushed it at European level, the main action points were that all new asylum seekers entering Greece from Turkey would be rapidly returned to Turkey.

Under existing readmission arrangements with Turkey, Greece was required to return people who did not claim asylum and people whose applications for asylum were judged to be unfounded. However, the third new category of returnees under the deal allows Greece to reject an asylum application without examining its substance. This occurs where Turkey is a “first country of asylum” and an individual already has protection there or where Turkey is deemed a “safe third country” and an individual can possibly claim protection there. The lawfulness of such returns is based on the idea that asylum seekers can receive effective protection in Turkey. In return, a 1:1 system was established in which for every Syrian readmitted by Turkey from Greece, another Syrian from Turkey would be admitted to the EU Member States up to a maximum of 72,000 people. Furthermore, the EU agreed to mobilise an additional €3 billion for Turkey by the end of 2018 and visa and accession talks were to be accelerated (European Council, 2016).

Human Right Concerns

First and foremost, the EU-Turkey deal rests on the presumption that Turkey is a “safe third country”. In EU law, the notion is outlined in the Asylum Procedures Directive (ADP), however, the ADP does not define “effective protection”. There has been no independent assessment carried out on whether Turkey can be deemed ‘safe’, despite calls by the Commission to do so. Based on UNHCR’s (2016) interpretation of the safe third country concept, five principles must be met. This involves that:

“life and liberty are not threatened on account of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, there is no risk of serious harm, the principle of non-refoulment in accordance with the Geneva Convention is respected, the prohibition of removal, in violation of the right to freedom from torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment as laid down in international law, is respected and the possibility exists to request refugee status and, if found to be a refugee, to receive protection in accordance with the Geneva Convention.”

Reports by international human rights agencies point to the conclusion that Turkey does not meet these requirements (Amnesty International, 2015 and 2016; Human Rights Watch, 2016 and 2017; Médecins Sans Frontieres, 2017). A serious matter of concern is the fact that Turkey is not part of the EU and therefore EU laws do not apply to the state, including procedural safeguards in the area of asylum. Although Turkey is a signatory to the Refugee Convention, it has been adopted with ‘geographical limitations.’ This clause allows Turkey to only grant limited protection to asylum seekers and refugees from outside the region of the EU, including reduced access to the labour market. Furthermore, Turkey is currently facing a severe housing crisis and state authorities are unable to meet shelter requirements for the huge influx in the population. Since the July 2016 failed coup attempt in Turkey, Erdogan “over 150,000 people were taken into custody, 78,000 were arrested and over 110,000 civil servants were dismissed” (European Commission, 2018). Furthermore, orders were given to close hundreds of Turkish civil society organisations, including several international NGO’s which were operating under EU funds. In Turkey’s 2018 progress report, the EU finds that Ankara has suffered serious relapses in the areas of justice, rule of law, fundamental rights and freedom of expression (European Commission, 2018).

Amnesty International’s Report for 2017/18 found that nearly 47,000 asylum-seekers remain trapped in severely overcrowded camps in Greece due to the closure of the Balkan migration route (Amnesty International, 2018). The assurance that all new arrivals on the Greek islands would be returned to Turkey under the deal has condemned many to extended asylum procedures, while being trapped in appalling ‘hotspot’ camps with one asylum seeker interviewed by The Economist (2018) noting that “residents can spend up to 12 hours a day in queues for food.” Amnesty International (2017) have reported that severe issues in the camps include “overcrowding, freezing temperatures, lack of hot water and heating, poor hygiene, bad nutrition, inadequate medical care, violence and hate motivated attacks.” Many NGOs have documented instances in which asylum seekers of certain nationalities were immediately detained upon arrival including Syrians with the expectation they would soon be returned to Turkey, and countries prejudged to be producing “economic migrants” rather than “refugees” (Human Rights Watch, 2016). Allegations of excessive use of force by the local police also persist with an ongoing investigation into the ill-treatment of individuals who protested over conditions in the Moria camp, on Lesvos in July 2017. In September 2017, the highest administrative court in Greece, the Greek Council of State, rejected the final appeals of two Syrians who had argued the basis that Turkey was not a safe country. This decision could result in the first forcible returns of Syrian asylum-seekers under the EU-Turkey deal.

Libyan Co-Operation:

The latest findings from the IOM (2018) find that there are currently around 670,000 migrants in Libya. Due to its relative closeness to Europe, particularly Italy and Malta, Libya has acted as a major transit country for migrants wishing to reach European shores. However, for this transit to take place, people must cross the Mediterranean and face “by far the world’s deadliest” route for migrants (IOM, 2017). 180,000 migrants arrived in Italy in 2016, which followed two previous years of large-scale arrivals of 153,000 and 170,000 thousand in 2014 and 2015 respectively (Feldstein, 2018). Risk levels with irregular sea crossings organised by smugglers, notably due to overcrowded, poor quality boats with little fuel and no safety features, has led to thousands of deaths each year in the Mediterranean. The launch of Mare Nostrum, an operation which lasted between October 2013 and October 2014, seen Italy engage in proactive patrolling and rescue missions in the central Mediterranean. It ended when European leaders began to view it a ‘pull factor’ for refugees and migrants, with it wrongly being regarded that it was encouraging more people to risk the journey. The expansion of its replacement, Frontex Joint Operation Triton which was initially very limited in scope, came following two major shipwrecks in April 2015 which claimed over 1,200 lives alone. NGO operations, funded by civil society, also continued to undertake private rescue missions. However, as the political priorities of European governments changed as seen with the EU-Turkey deal above, actions aimed at reducing the number of people arriving in Europe also affected the central Mediterranean route. Outsourcing border controls and countering human smuggling began to overtake the role of search and rescue.

On the eve of the February 2017 EU summit in Malta, Council President Donald Tusk promised the closure of this migratory route. The summit subsequently led to a signing of a Memorandum of Understanding between the Italian and Libyan government in which they would aim to “combat illegal immigration, human trafficking and contraband and… reinforce the border security between the Libya State and the Italian Republic” (Odysseus Network, 2017). A partnership in the area of migration had already somewhat existed between the two states prior, which led to Italy financing several immigration detention centres in Libya (Levy, 2010; Del Sarto, 2010; Global Detention Project, 2015). However, cooperation now aimed to go further with the training, providing of equipment and financial support for the Libyan Navy and Coast Guard to intercept migrant boats exiting Libyan territorial waters. As reported by Merelli (2017), while financial support once stood at around €26 million, at the time of his findings this had reached €210 million. Support for the deal from the EU came with its official endorsement in the Malta Declaration. In a press conference following the announcement of the Declaration, President Tusk stated that its primary purpose is to “help reduce the number of irregular migrants and save lives at sea” (European Council, 2017). Yet the scale of suffering at sea is only part of the perilous experience of migrants transiting through Libya.

Human Right Concerns

The new UN-backed Libyan government was the result of decisions taken by European and US-NATO coalition leaders in 2011 to depose of Libyan President Muammar Gaddafi. In the aftermath, devoid of secure political institutions and sound democratic society, Libya sank into civil war and became a breeding ground for instability. As Kuperman (2015) notes “Libya has not only failed to evolve into a democracy; it has devolved into a failed state. Violent deaths and other human rights abuses have increased severalfold.” Failing to adequately rebuild Libya after Gaddafi’s removal seen Western powers including the EU exacerbate conditions for migrants in the country. Under current Libyan law, those who undertake irregular entry are criminalised, an offence punishable by a prison sentence, fines and deportation. The country has not signed the UN 1951 Refugee Convention or formalised UNCHR presence. With the absence of legislation and infrastructure to protect asylum seekers, “mass, arbitrary and indefinite detention has become the primary migration management system in the country” (Amnesty International, 2017). According to the UNCHR (2018), at least 8,000 migrants are currently being held in 18 government recognised detention centres. However, due to a lack of security institutions, it is believed that thousands more are being held in detainment in buildings run by Libyan criminal gangs. According to Amnesty International’s report, attempts at security reform in Libya between 2011 and 2014 seen these militias “incorporated into or affiliated with the ministries of interior and defence, without thorough vetting, sometimes without any vetting.” In both instances, people are facing inhumane living conditions, inadequate nutrition and are subject to torture, degrading punishment and sexual violence. The prevalent use of such treatment is often to extort a ransom from the detainees and their families to escape the indefinite captivity. As one individual reported to the Irish Times, he was tortured until “his family paid $12,000 (€10,280), which they raised by selling their belongings and begging for money from friends” (Hayden, 2018).

The state of lawlessness in Libya with the absence of a central state authority and security apparatus to control militias and criminal gangs has resulted in people smuggling becoming a thriving and profitable industry. With the integration of militia members into the legitimate state security structure as mentioned above, several members have joined the Libyan Coast Guard (LCG) with aims of controlling the coast. Collaboration with smugglers who have paid members of the LCG a fee has resulted in certain departing boats being given a safe passage by the LCG until they reach international waters or not being intercepted. The disregard for security and safety standards by the LCG has led to a number of dangerous situations and humanitarian violations, including the disappearance at sea of up to 50 people on the 6th of November 2017 during a rescue operation. The LCG, using a ship Ras Jadir, donated by Italy to Libyan authorities, failed to deploy its inflatable boats and instead forced migrants to climb the high sides of the ship resulting in many people falling into the water. On the 23rd of May 2017, Médecins Sans Frontières and SOS Méditerranée reported that following one of their rescue missions, migrants on board were approached by members of the LCG demanding money and mobile phones while firing shots in the air. On the 18th of July 2018, the LCG was accused of abandoning three people at sea, including a mother and a toddler, after they refused to board their ship to return to Libya and their boat was destroyed by the LCG in an interception mission (The Guardian, 2018). Severe incidents of harassment towards NGO vessels providing rescue operations, including declaring Libyan zones in which other vessels were not to enter, have also been widely documented and have greatly impeded search and rescue missions.

Analysis of the Deals:

According to Ardent (1951), it is not the loss of one particular right that a refugee or asylum seeker loses, but the “right to have rights”. She states that,

“No paradox of contemporary politics is filled with a more poignant irony than the discrepancy between the efforts of well-meaning idealists who stubbornly insist on regarding as ‘inalienable’ those human rights, which are enjoyed only by citizens of the most prosperous and civilized countries, and the situation of the rightless themselves.”

Seeming like a ‘big-win’ for the EU, the EU-Turkey deal saw arrivals to Greece fall from almost 1 million in the year before the deal to 82,000 in the two and a half years since (The Economist, 2018). However, for those arriving on the Greek islands after the deal came into force, they now had to remain on the islands for the entirety of their asylum-application process with major problems with backlogging and overcrowding. With increased restrictions on mobility for asylum seekers who could no longer travel further into Europe, Greece in 2018 has received nearly “four times as many applicants as in 2015” (The Economist, 2018). Many international organisations including Save the Children, Amnesty International, Doctors Without Borders, International Rescue Committee and the Norwegian Refugee Council to name a few have refused to assist in implementing the deal. Currently, there are 65,000 asylum seekers in Greece and the EU has awarded Greece €1.6 billion over the last five years to aid the migration situation. However, the country’s asylum system has increasingly run into non-financial barriers regarding logistic issues, opposition, long processing times and underqualified and a shortage of staff. The International Rescue Committee reports that there is “enormous mental strain” on asylum-seekers living in Moria camp on Lesbos. They have found that 30% of the 9,000 people living in the camp have attempted suicide, while an additional 60% have contemplated it (Tagaris, 2018). Medecins Sans Frontiers (2018) have recognised this state of emergency also among children with nearly a quarter of 6 to 18-year olds having harmed themselves or attempted/contemplated suicide between February to June 2018.

Similarly, Open Migration (2018) reported that between Jan-May 2017 and 2018, the number of migrants reaching Italian shores has dropped 77.7%. However, despite EU achieving initial objectives, this reduction has come at a devastating cost to human life with 1,267 deaths at sea along the Central Migration route in 2018 thus far and thousands remaining trapped in detention centres (IOM, 2018). In Amnesty International’s (2018) report, there has been no independent monitoring or accountability mechanisms employed by the EU or Italy to ensure provisions provided by the two entities to strengthen Libyan capacities do not violate human rights. They have also failed to develop a system to register and track those intercepted and sent back to Libya. Clear knowledge of human rights abuses facing migrants in Libya has been well documented for years by representatives of Italian and EU governments and agencies, including a leaked report by the EU Border Assistance Mission to Libya from January 2017. This report stated that “there are reports about these DCs detention centres which describe gross human rights violations and extreme abuse and mishandling of detainees, including sexual abuse, slavery, forced prostitution, torture and maltreatment.” Footage also emerged in November 2017 of migrants being sold as slaves in Libya for roughly $400 (Quackenbush, 2017). Following alleged pressure by the Italian government, the Panama Maritime Authority decided to deflag the Aquarius vessel in September 2018. Currently, without a country willing to issue a flag to the vessel, the Aquarius which operated as the last civilian rescue ship in the Mediterranean by Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) and SOS Méditerranée, is a symbol of European failure.

Non-Refoulment:

Following the announcement of the EU-Turkey deal, the Europe regional director of the UNCHR stated that “the collective expulsion of foreigners is prohibited under the European Convention of Human Rights… an agreement that would be tantamount to a blanket return of any foreigners to a third country is not consistent with European law, is not consistent with international law” (Spindler and Clayton, 2016). The concept of non-refoulment, other than in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union is further found in the prohibition against torture in the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. Violations to the principle can take place both directly, when a state sends an individual back to face persecution, or indirectly through the Dublin rules in the EU context. This occurs when a state sends an individual to a second recipient state, where they knew or ought to have known that the recipient state would not properly process their application, leading to a higher likelihood of a rejected application and potential refoulment. Policies masked in being instrumental in saving lives seems to direct more to stem flows of illegal migration. As stated by Amnesty International (2018), there is the concern that “European governments have substituted clearly prohibited push-back measures with subsidized, or subcontracted, pull-back measures”. As major flaws have been recognised with Turkey’s relatively new asylum system and it is not deemed a ‘safe third country’, the EU, as well as Turkey, are therefore potentially guilty of such practices. Italian naval ships that are involved in operations with the clear outcome of returning refugees and migrants to Libya is an example of engaging in refoulment. Furthermore, as seen in the EU-Turkey deal, in a less obvious form of refoulment their continued support for the LCG could also be considered grounds indirectly violating non-refoulment and obligations under international law.

Increasing the Sphere of Equality:

Despite the pressure large immigration influxes place on social infrastructure, reports show that in the long-term the economic benefits remain neutral or can outweigh the costs (OECD 2014 and Koser, 2007). The Gay Science published by the stateless migrant Friedrich Nietzsche (1882), valorises the transformative power of the migrant. In aphorism 337, “We who are homeless”, Nietzsche address migrants as the “children of the future”. At a time which correlations to the present when millions of people were moving around Europe, Nietzsche addresses migrants as being people who have pushed the furthest by rejecting “ideals that might lead one to feel at home even in this fragile, broken time of transition” and a “return to any past periods”. It is migrants who are too “well travelled” and too “racially mixed” to give in to “the European system of a lot of petty states”. The possibility of creating a new world is outlined in the final lines as he states, “the hidden Yes in you is stronger than all Nos and Maybes that afflict you and your age like a disease; and when you have to embark on the sea, you emigrants, you, too, are compelled to this by – a faith!”. The theory of human rights in relation to the migrant, must put the latter at the center. If the novel issue of our time is indeed the “permanently resident mass of noncitizens”, then political philosophy must be built with this in mind in regards to citizenship, borders, rights and sovereignty. As Agamben (2000) said,

“if we want to be equal to the absolutely new tasks ahead, we will have to abandon decidedly, without reserve, the fundamental concepts through which we have so far represented the subjects of the political (Man, the Citizen and its rights, but also the sovereign people, the worker, and so forth) and build our political philosophy anew starting from the one and only figure of the refugee”

Conclusion:

With deteriorating conditions for migrants in Turkey, Greece and Libya, this reality remains at odds with the rhetoric that the EU deals are a measure justifiable to reduce deaths and increase human dignity. Instead, they seem to correspond to the philosophy that seems to inform EU migration policy as a whole: containment and externalisation. As stated by Peel, Hope and Pitel (2018) it is “symptomatic of an approach that prizes keeping people out of the EU as the primary, if not the only, goal”. Providing training, equipment and financial supports to enhance LCG capacity, EU countries have ultimately empowered the LCG as a proxy with the task of intercepting and returning migrants and refugees at sea to Libya. Through hampering with the work of civil society sponsored NGOs also operating in the Mediterranean, Italian and Libyan authorities have almost guaranteed that the LCG will be able to operate undisturbed in their goals. With no possibility to apply for asylum in Libya and with a lack of commitment by European leaders to offer international protection, migrants and refugees are facing indefinite and inhuman detention in Libya. Similarly, the EU-Turkey deal has bore witness to the entrapment of tens of thousands on people on the Greek islands, in particular a number of mothers with young children, people with disabilities and other vulnerable groups. With extremely inadequate shelter, nutrition and medical care, the wellbeing of the camp’s inhabitants is extremely fragile especially with the onset of Winter. In both cases there is a clear argument that the EU is violating the Geneva Conventions and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights most substantially in the area of non-refoulment. The most notable results from both deals have been the decrease in the number of irregular migrants reaching European shores. However, EU money is not an adequate substitute for fairly-distributed and effective relocation measures. Migrants are not exceptional or marginal figures, but rather the essential ingredient to which all existing societies have been sustained and expanded over time.

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